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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the different meanings of Ehrlich's idea of living law 
in relation to current debates about legal pluralism. It distinguishes three   
aspects of Ehrlich's concept as these have been elaborated in the later 
literature: 'law beyond the law', 'law without the state', and 'order without 
law'. This retrospective shows that Ehrlich was not principally concerned 
with defending the rights of ethnic or autonomous communities as such. In 
taking his work further it is  important to recognise how far official and 
unofficial law are even more interdependent than in his day. But we may 
still find his work of relevance for thinking about the normative challenges 
of plural legalities. 
 
 Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural Legalities 
1
 
 
David Nelken 
 
The theme of this special issue is the need to recognise the overlap 
between three current socio- legal developments: legal pluralism- or the 
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 This paper develops out of a much longer study of the influence of Eugen 
Ehrlich on later writers which will be published in MARC HERTOGH ed., 
REDISCOVERING EHRLICH, Hart, Oxford (forthcoming). 
granting of recognition to different forms and forums of dispute- 
resolution, the privatisation of law - or the move towards the 
decentralisation of law making, and multiculturalism- the delegation of 
authority to sub - state communities. It is suggested that 'the thinking 
taking place in each of the three spheres calls for close ties to the work 
conducted in the other two'.The work of Eugen Ehrlich, the founder of the 
sociology of law, might be thought to be particularly relevant to these 
interconnecting themes. His apparent  down- grading of the role of the 
Austro- Hapsburg state when it came to daily life in Bukowina offers an 
illustration of what might be thought to be a type of  privatisation of law. 
He is widely seen as one of the first writers to point clearly to the 
coexistence of plural legalities. And the de facto multiculturalisim of this 
frontier province in which Armenians, Germans, Rumanians, Russians, 
Ruthenians, Slovaks, Hungarians, Jews and Gypsies lived side by side may 
still have something to teach us at a time in which nation-states are being 
reshaped in the current round of transnational population movements.   
 
Although Ehrlich is  referred to by some of the other contributors  to this 
special issue he tends to figure only as a progenitor, a footnote from the 
past. The question I want to adress however is how far Ehrlich's work can 
still be useful today. The challenges we need to meet now would seem to 
be very different from those he faced before the first world war  in the far 
flung Bukowina province of the old Austro- Habsburg empire.  If Ehrlich's 
work is taken as an early approach to the issue of  multiculturalism and 
law it is also one that is thought to needs updating so as to allow us to 
understand the legal fragmentation caused by current developments at a 
time of globalisation. One way to do this is to read him through the lens of  
more recent  social theory such as that represented by Niklas Luhman
2
. 
Recently for example, Gunther Teubner has used Ehrlich's ideas as a foil 
against which to contrast past and modern legal pluralism.
 3
 Law, he tell us  
is ‘not drawing its strength now from ethnic communities as the old living 
law was supposed to do'.
4
 ' Ehrlich', Teubner explains, 'was of course 
romanticizing the law -creating role of customs, habits and practices in 
small scale rural communities'. The global world, by contrast, he argues, 
relies on 'cold technical processes not on warm communal bonds'.  
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 See Kurt A. Ziegert,  (2001) Introduction, to Eugen Ehrlich's, THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick,: 19-44. 
3
 Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the world 
society, in GUNTHER TEUBNER ed. GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A 
STATE, Dartmouth, Aldershot: 3-28. (1997. 
4
 The formulation of this sentence is somewhat ambiguous and it is 
therefore not entirely clear whether Teubner himself totally endorses this 
account of Ehrlich’s ideas. Does ‘supposed to do ’ here  mean ’as 
commonly thought’? But then, if Teubner knows better- why does he 
makes it seem as if this does represent Ehrlich's views? Or does ‘ supposed 
to do ‘ mean what living law ‘should’ reflect the different laws of ethnic 
communities? This would be a different claim having less to do with 
where law comes from than with the need to recognize cultural diversity. 
But the assumption that Ehrlich was putting forward a strong thesis of 
legal pluralism rooted in ethnic communities is a tendentious interpretation 
which has poor support in the text itself
5
- even if Teubner is certainly not 
the only commentator to take such a line. This way of reading Ehrlich also 
displays the genetic fallacy by confusing factors that may have helped give 
rise to his argument, with the substance and validity of his ideas 
themselves. In fact, Ehrlich's claims were intended to be potentially 
universalisable ones, applicable also to settings quite different from 
Bukowina, and had less to do with the rights of ethnic groups than with the 
way law- like norms are created through everyday life in ‘associations’, 
whether we are talking about peasants’ farmholdings or the behaviour of 
banks and other commercial enterprises in deciding whether  or not to sue 
their debtors. This helps explain why the question of ethnic pluralism was 
not the main issue for early critics of Ehrlich such as Kelsen, whose 
objection was more to Ehrlich linking law to the actual normative practices 
of groups even when these were inconsistent with the Austrian legal code.
6
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 EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, (W.L. Moll, trans.) with introduction by Roscoe 
Pound. New York: Russell and Russell. (1936/1962). 
6
 What is more, interpreting Ehrlich in terms of Luhmann's categories 
requires more than a little rewriting of what he actually said. A detailed 
critique of Teubner's appropriation of Ehrlich will be found in David 
Nelken, An e -mail from Global Bukowina, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF LAW IN CONTEXT, (2007). 
A key term which Ehrlich used was that of 'living law'. As we shall see, 
this idea continues to be an essential point of reference for  those seeking 
to understand phenomena such as the new lex mercatoria, the law of the 
internet, and the globalising spread of human rights law. So what did 
Ehrlich mean by living law?  In what follows I shall first set out Ehrlich's 
definition of this key term and then go on explore three ways in which his 
idea has been developed in later writing. I shall argue that though Ehrlich 
can be and has been used to support one or other position in debates over 
such controversial subjects as whether the law of non - state groups should 
count as 'law', his aim was to help us grasp how normative patterns emerge 
from social life, whether or not they are then endorsed by states, 
legislatures, courts or administrators. As compared to when he developed 
his ideas, however, research shows that there is now a considerable 
interdependence between official and living law not only in the domestic 
but even in the international sphere. This will need to be borne in mind in 
making claims based on the possible or ideal autonomy of non- state or 
sub -state  legal regimes. In the final section I shall draw out some of the 
implications of this argument for the questions raised in this special issue. 
 
Three aspects of living law 
 
The canonical definition of what is meant by ‘living law’ is usually taken 
to be Ehrlich’s statement that, ‘The living law is the law which dominates 
life itself even though it has not been posited in legal propositions. The 
source of our knowledge of this law is, first, the modern legal document; 
secondly, direct observation of life, of commerce, of customs and usages 
and of all associations, not only those that the law has recognised but also 
of those that it has overlooked and passed by, indeed even of those that it 
has disapproved’ 
7
But this definition has some remarkable features. In the 
first place it is in large part mainly an indication of method. It tells us 
where to look (and how to look) for something, but the existence of that 
something is predicated on unspecified theoretical grounds. It is also 
difficult to see what his examples have in common other than the fact that 
they may all be illustrations of normative phenomena that elite lawyers in 
Vienna may not know about - or even want to know about. In any case, as 
is usual in the development of academic disciplines, what is presented by 
Ehrlich as one theoretical category is seen by later writers as grouping 
together a number of not necessarily homogenous phenomena. Following 
up the later reception of Ehrlich’s work in the relevant secondary literature 
we will find that we have to deal with different legacies rather than assume 
that scholars have all taken the same message from what he wrote. 
 
In his description of living law, Ehrlich puts together the creation or 
employment of law by lawyers (and others), the rules and usages of 
associations that are ‘recognised’ by or will develop into (state) law, as 
well as, most remarkably, the shared practices of associations that are 
disapproved of by the state and have no aspiration to be included in the 
sway of its law. Some later scholars who follow him have mainly shown 
interest in what else law does - the actual practice of legal officials, 
administrators as well as all those who use or are affected by the law. 
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Others have focused more on what else does law, even to the extent of 
detecting the existence of rival legal systems. Finally, yet others are 
searching for the sources of normative order, what Durkheim called 'the 
pre- contractual basis of contract' .
8
For the purposes of illustration it may 
be helpful to distinguish developments in the study of law beyond the law, 
(law other than that contained in statutes and judgements), law without the 
State, (especially the coexistence of  plural legal regimes), and order 
without law (the implicit norms that make order possible).  
 
There is certainly some overlap between the phenomena that are studied 
under each of these rubrics, and this goes beyond the common 
denominator that we cannot afford to restrict ourselves to the study of 
legal codes and court decisions if we want to understand’ law in society’. 
But there are also important differences in the issues that each of them 
raise. If we may wonder whether Ehrlich was right to combine into one 
category his examples of youngsters giving over the pay for their work to 
their parents, and businessmen not insisting on being paid by their 
creditors, the situation becomes even more complex when we seek to 
include as examples of living law the avoidance of legal relations by 
automobile dealers, the alternative sanctioning mechanisms used by 
diamond merchants, or the accepted practices of queuing for the cinema. 
Because the differences may be as important as what they have in common 
we shall deal with each of these aspects separately.
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 The law beyond the Law 
 
The first part of Ehrlich’s definition reminds us, as he would put it , that 
Law 'cannot imprisoned in a code'. We need to go ‘beyond’ the law books 
so as to take into account both the role of society in generating state law 
and judicial sentences and the way it shape laws and decisions as they seek 
to influence social life. Ehrlich’s exemplar, the ‘modern legal document’ 
might not at first sight seem as the most obvious starting point for grasping 
this aspect of living law. But those who engage in the sociology of 
substantive areas of law certainly can learn a great deal from focussing on 
legal documents.  Many of the books in the path- breaking ‘law in context’ 
series (published in the UK from the 1960's onwards)  did exactly this, 
gathering information about the contracts used by consulting engineers, or 
the standard form contracts of hire purchase or dry cleaners, so as to reveal 
a world of law at variance with that presupposed by the more traditional 
textbooks. Giving attention to documents is also crucial to understanding 
the construction of transnational legal agreements and regulatory modes by 
legal professionals. 
 
It is impossible to trace the full influence of Ehrlich's insights here - these 
are now woven into the warp and woof of sociology of law. Ehrlich's 
claim that ‘the centre of gravity of legal development lies not in 
legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in society 
itself’ could well be taken as the leitmotiv of the contributions to the field 
by Lawrence Friedman, one of the most distinguished of contemporary 
social historians of law. More generally, the argument that there is more to 
law than what can be found in statutes and court decisions is constitutive 
of any interdisciplinary approach to law. All the most famous studies over 
the last 50 years (mainly, it has to be said, coming from the United States), 
such as those by Macaulay or Galanter, have mainly to do with the way 
non- legal factors shape the use of law. At first sight it might be thought 
that 'law in action' is not strictly relevant to this confenrece Non state law 
but often related expression of living law ceratinly is  is state law result of 
orgamnisations develop own loyalties nothing to do with state . Moreover 
any attempt to delegate or divide up normative orders will need to bear in 
mind this distinction. 
 
But the idea that there is a law beyond the law has not always been taken 
in the same direction. Many have followed Pound and the Legal Realists in 
studying the 'Law in action’ so as to explore the practical implementation 
of laws or of judicial and administrative decisions
9
. Others have sought 
rather to  understand the ‘legal consciousness’ of those who use or are 
affected by the law, showing how ideas of legality and what it represents 
circulate and shape such consciousness at least as much as they are its 
product. 
10
 Marc Hertogh has sought to integrate Pound's common law and 
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 The alleged equation between 'law in action' and 'living law' is examined 
critically in David Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law? Back to the 
Beginning in Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUDIES: 157. (1984). 
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 SUSAN SILBEY and PATRICIA EWICK, THE COMMON PLACE 
OF LAW, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998; Susan Silbey, 
Ehrlich more continental approach in order to investigate the interaction 
between law in action and legal consciousness. His case study of the use of 
discretion by housing officials shows how they mediate between the legal 
principle of formal equality enshrined in the Rechtsstaat and a wider 
popular legal consciousness which values responsiveness and material 
equality.
11
 
 
At the same time the claim that law has more to do with its given local 
context than with the wider process of rule production in the legislature 
and courts has never been uncontroversial. As Rheinstein pointed out in an 
early appraisal of Ehrlich's work
12
, this is likely to vary by types of law. 
Later empirical research showed that forms of law, such as that to do with 
labour relations, did not necessarily correspond to particular forms of 
social organisation in ways that would be expected 
13
.There have also been 
                                                                                                                                                                  
After Legal Consciousness, 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science: 
323-368. (2005) 
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Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich, 31 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY: 
457- 481 (2004). 
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 Max Rheinstein, Sociology of law, Apropos Moll’s translation of Eugen 
Ehrlich’s Grundlegung der soziologie des Rechts, JOURNAL OF 
ETHICS, 48: 232-239. (1938). 
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 STUART HENRY, PRIVATE JUSTICE: TOWARD INTEGRATED 
THEORIZING IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London, (1983) ; David Nelken, 'Beyond the Study of "Law and 
some attempts to break out of the whole paradigm of trying to fit 'law' to 
'society' .
14
Most radically, Luhmann, first in his systems theory approach, 
and even more in his autopoietic social theory, insisted that law could only 
relate to its own communicative constructions of its environment rather 
than actually have direct connections with it.  
 
Legal historians and comparative lawyers have often stressed that law can 
be out of step with society, or be linked to foreign sources rather than 
being embedded in the society in which it is found
15
. The obvious response 
is that the law that 'really' matters will always be that which is actually 
operating and therefore being shaped locally. But this risks being 
tautological. For others, both critical legal scholars and some post-modern 
social theorists, on the other hand, law is even more tightly bound up with 
society than Ehrlich thought.
 
It is state law, official law, that shapes 
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 David Nelken, Comparativists and Transferability, in PIERRE 
LEGRAND and RODERICK MUNDAY eds. COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 437-466. (2003). 
society's deepest conceptions quite as much as the reverse. Some speak 
here of Law's constitutive role. In a recent discussion of intellectual 
property law, for example Rosemary Coombe and Jonathan Cohen argue 
that ‘a critical cultural legal studies reveals that law is fully imbricated in 
shaping lifeworld activities, bestowing propriety powers, creating markets, 
establishing forms of cultural authority, constraining speech, and policing 
the public/ private distinction (that protects corporate authors from social 
accountability.‘
16
As they go on to say,  ‘Law is a palpable presence when 
people create their own alternative standards and sanctions governing the 
use of corporate properties in the moral economies that emerge in law’s 
shadows’. Intellectual property law does not function in a rule like fashion 
as a regime of rights and obligations but also simultaneously as ‘a 
generative condition and prohibitive boundary for practices of political 
expression, public- sphere formation, and counter- public articulations of 
political aspiration’
17
. 
 
For Ehrlich the key to the unfolding of law was to be found in the role of 
associations. Amongst the many  important developments of this idea may 
be noted Karl Renner's demonstration - this time as seen from Vienna, 
rather than from the periphery- that codified property law could easily 
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 Rosemary Coombe, with Jonathan Cohen,  The law and late modern 
culture: Reflections on 'between facts and norms' from the perspective of 
critical legal studies, 76 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW: 1029 
at 1031. (1999). 
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 Coombe and Cohen, op.cit: 1043. 
become no more than a dead husk in respect of the actual developments in 
the actual organisation of capitalist firms or large rented tenements 
18
From 
the 1950's on the work of Lon Fuller at Harvard and Philip Selznick at 
Berkeley examined roots of  (and the need for) ‘legality’ within the 
structure of organisational life.
19
 The most recent studies by Lauren 
Edelman and her collaborators, also based in Berkeley, using the approach 
of  institutional sociology to focus on the role of organisations, confirm 
Ehrlich's ideas about the role of associations in creating the living law. On 
the other hand, they also show that official norms and those of the 
organisations themselves are (now)  far more intertwined and 
interdependent than Ehrlich envisaged when first contrasting living law 
and 'norms for decision'. 
 
In one recent paper which deals with organizationally constructed symbols 
of compliance following the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
20
 Edelman et.al. coin 
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 KARL RENNER, THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND 
THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTION, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
(1949). 
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 LON FULLER, . AND KENNETH WINSTON, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SOCIAL ORDER, Hart, Oxford, 2001; PHILIP SELZNICK,  LAW, 
SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, Russel Sage, New York, 
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 Lauren B., Edelman, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Scott R Eliason,., 
Catherine Albiston, and Virginia A Mellema, When Organizations Rule: 
Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures (June 21, 
the term ' legal endogeneity'. This refers, they say,  to ' a subtle and 
powerful process through which institutionalized organizational practices 
and structures influence judicial conceptions of legality and compliance.' 
They argue that 'organizational structures such as grievance procedures, 
anti-harassment policies, evaluation procedures, and formal hiring 
procedures become symbolic indicia of compliance with civil rights 
law...as they become increasingly institutionalized, judges begin to use 
their presence or absence in evaluating whether or not an organization 
discriminated. Ultimately, these structures becomes so closely associated 
with rationality and fairness that judges become less likely to scrutinize 
whether they in fact operate in a manner that promotes non-discriminatory 
treatment.'  As Rheinstein suggested, however, we should be careful before  
generalising too much from intellectual property law or anti- 
discrimination law. As Edelman et. al .themselves note, lawmaking that 
sets forth broad and often ambiguous principles give organizations 
particularly wide latitude to construct the meaning of compliance. 
 
 Law without the state 
 
The second approach to living law that we can trace back to Ehrlich is one 
less focused on how official law is shaped or reshaped and more interested 
in uncovering the existence of  legal regimes that do not have or need the 
backing of the state. The key problem here, which is also central to this 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2006). 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper . 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=910940 
special issue, is how to take into account the fact that there can (also) be 
non -state law, and sub- state private legal regimes. As Teubner puts it, for 
this literature, ‘law or not law is the question’. Although Gurvitch has 
stronger claims than Ehrlich to having developed a rich (even over rich) 
sociological theory of plural legal orders 
21
 discussions about legal 
pluralism often refer to Ehrlich's writings and current debates continue to 
make explicit reference to his ideas. Unfortunately, however, many writers 
still tend to reduce Ehrlich's contribution to the importance he allegedly 
attributed to preserving ethnic and cultural pluralism. But the varied 
examples of living law he offered, which included businessmen not 
insisting on claiming their debts, give the lie to such reductivism.   
 
Ehrlich famously argued that the state does not have a monopoly over the 
law. He would also have agreed with Llewellyn (who in fact was an 
admirer of his work) when the latter argued later that ' law jobs' do not 
have to be done by state institutions. Although Ehrlich focused mainly on 
the jurisgenerative propensities of communities and associations his 
writing has also rightly been taken as inspiration for those have gone on to 
argue, more broadly, that more or less autonomous 'social fields' can create 
their own set of norms and sanctioning mechanisms
22
. The focus of more 
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 GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, Routledge Kegan 
Paul, London, (1947). 
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 Sally Falk Moore, The Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate 
Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW: 719-46 (1973); Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
recent writing, however, is on the way that globalisation is increasingly 
'uncoupling'  law from the state. Transnational enterprises and 
transnational forms of communication and regulation have thus emerged 
as an important new source of legal pluralism. 
 
Two key examples of such new forms of legal pluralism which have 
provided the occasion for rediscovering Ehrlich's ideas about living law 
are lex mercatoria, as discussed for example in Teubner’s collection 
Global Law without a State
23
, and the governance of the internet, as in 
Rowland’s discussion of 'Law in Cyberspace' .
24
For these authors, as for 
many other commentators, the question of whether these regimes can be 
described as law is strongly linked to the issue of whether they should be 
so recognised (as if 'calling' them law will help make them so). And the 
answer is not necessarily the same in each case. whilst the first has to do 
more with norm making by or for businessmen as an attempt to create 
interstitial order, the other has to do with an allegedly virtual space.  
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In an important article which he examines both phenomena from the point 
of view of  an expert on conflicts of law, Ralf Michaels compares them in 
relation to the different criteria that can be used for defining law. He  
accepts that both lex mercatoria and the internet can promote social 
ordering and social control. But, he claims that whilst the new law 
merchant also aims at dispute resolution this is less clear with the internet. 
Moving to the structural criterion, law merchant imposes binding 
obligations on tradesmen, while the internet, he rightly suggests, controls 
rather through its technology, its architecture. Law merchant is referred to 
by some (though not all) participants as law; this again, is true for the 
internet. Certainly, merchants consider themselves some kind of 
“community”, the same may be true of users of the internet. He concludes 
that while the new law merchant has a good claim to qualify as “law” 
under most named criteria, proponents of an autonomous internet law have 
a harder case to make. 
25
 
 
Nonetheless, Michaels insists that, from a juristic perspective, neither of 
these regimes, nor any other legal system which can be shown to be only 
semi- autonomous, can be rightly described as law. The crucial point for 
him is that they all require the state to 'recognise' their legal validity. He 
points out that we do not let parties develop any private law they choose. If 
, for example, the diamond merchants studied by Bernstein 'wanted to cut 
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 Ralf Michaels,  The Re-Statement of Non-State Law: The State, Choice 
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off the hands of dealers who broke their contracts, the state would interfere 
– just as it does with the private law systems of organized crime.’
26
 In 
practice, Michaels explains, the state has three ways to cope with other 
normative orders: incorporation, delegation, and deference. Through 
incorporation, which applies for example to lex mercatoria, rules count as 
law  only insofar as they become part of the law of the state. This, he 
argues, ' is perfectly compatible with Ehrlich’s insight that the production 
of law mainly happens on the periphery, within society. Yet the insight 
loses its revolutionary potential. The state is able to domesticate this 
potentially subversive development through the incorporation of the norms 
that are created. It recognizes non-state communities as generators of 
norms, but it denies these norms the status of autonomous law. Instead, by 
incorporating these norms into state law, the state reiterates its own 
monopoly on the production of legal norms'. 
 
Michaels also refers to Ehrlich's arguments when discussing the strategy of 
deference. ' (T)he state' , he explains,' may leave it to commercial practices 
and professional standards to develop the appropriate standard of care, the 
typical expectations necessary for interpreting contracts, etc. This is the 
approach most frequently seen as an answer to Ehrlich’s “living law”. 
Again, living law is not ignored by the law of the state, but neither is it 
recognized as law. The state and its law do not conceptualize their relation 
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 The fact that Ehrlich actually included this as an example of what he 
called living law suggests that he was not looking for a criterion of legal 
validity. 
to such spaces of private ordering as a relation to foreign laws, to be 
handled by rules of conflict of laws. Rather, the state refrains from 
interfering, or, put differently, it defers to the private interactions of 
individuals. The whole public / private distinction, as we know well by 
know, takes place within the framework of the state’s law. Private ordering 
enters the substantive law of the state at the time of enforcement as fact – 
as customs, general expectations, etc., that must be taken into account in 
the application of the state’s laws, but that do not constitute such norms in 
themselves.  
 
Finally, Michaels tells us, ' A third operation, somewhat similar to 
deference, treats such orders as legal orders separate from the state’s own 
law, but still denies them full autonomy. This process can be called 
delegation. Instead of regulating on its own, the state defers to the self-
regulation by interested groups. Examples of delegation abound. 
Autonomous labour agreements between unions and employers have the 
force of law; codes of conduct of regulated or unregulated industries 
substitute possible regulation by the state, etc. Indeed, this idea of the 
contract was one basis for the idea of the new law merchant (“contrat sans 
loi”). in the very moment in which they are attached and subordinated to 
the state and its law... Non-state law turns into sub-state law. 
 
Michaels is very wary of crediting 'communities and fields with the power 
to create law. But he admits that his juristic perspective, one ' intrinsic to 
operations of the legal system itself' is not the only way to look at the 
question. ' (L)egal pluralism, legal sociology and legal anthropology' he 
explains, ' may well have different definitions of law, because they are 
interested in different aspects of law. And, for their part, even those 
sociologists and anthropologists most committed to the idea of legal 
pluralism will concede that the state will usually seek to deny the 
legitimacy of rival regimes. Michaels is quite willing to admit that, from a 
sociological or anthropological perspective, it may (or may not) make 
sense to refer to all normative orders in communities as “law”. In fact, 
both legal scholars and social scientists are be found on both sides of the 
divide regarding whether we should describe rival or sub state legal 
regimes as law.  
 
Legal scholars such as Berman (with whom Michaels polemicises) argue 
that communities have the power of ' jurispersuasion'.
27
 In a provocative 
recent essay, Melissaris even extends the notion of communities to groups 
such as queues arguing that  ' Only when the legal commitment of clubbers 
who queue patiently at a bouncer’s orders is treated as seriously as the 
legal commitment of communities with religious or other moral bonds will 
the pluralistic study of the law be able to move away from the essentially 
positivistic external study of groups to the study of legal discourses.' 
28
 But 
some would say this was a reductu ad absurdum. Anthropologists have 
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been amongst those most convinced that state law is far too narrow a 
perspective for many of the societies they study
29
. But other social 
theorists, such as Brian Tamanaha, argue that what is crucial is the way 
people use the term 'law' - which usually privileges state law. 
30
It has even 
been argued that extending the label 'law' to non state regimes means 
imposing a state- like definition of law. For Simon Roberts, “Law, long so 
garrulous about itself, is now, in its contemporary enlargement, graciously 
embracing others in its discourse, seeking to tell those others what they 
are.'
31
 
 
But, whether or not social scientists are entitled to use the term law as they 
wish, a more important question has to do with how far Ehrlich's notion of 
living law helps or hinders our understanding of these emergent 
phenomena. Take, for example, law- making by cyber communities. In a 
relatively early paper on this topic, which explicitly takes its inspiration 
from Ehrlich, Rowland makes an effort to tease out the living law of such 
communities. She argues that the ‘ impact of new communications 
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technology on both social relationships and law-making processes is still 
in its infancy.. that (t)here are myriad political processes at work in all 
societies but the decentralized nature of the Internet makes it particularly 
difficult to understand either the manner in which power can be exercised, 
by whom and within what limits‘. For her, we need to face the fact that 
cyber  communities 'challenge state- based  models of lawmaking as well 
as many of our preconceptions of the attributes of society and 
community’
32
.  
 
Rowland expresses concern about ‘imposing on the organization and use 
of the Internet a social construct which is entirely inappropriate both in 
idea and substance'. 'Thus far,' she argues'  legal rules external to 
Cyberspace have not been conspicuously successful at regulating the 
global computer network..( and) … may only succeed in regulating 
Cyberspace when the social conditions pertaining in cyber communities 
are acknowledged and understood'. One can imagine Ehrlich sharing such 
cautions. At the same. however, she suggests, law may be forming itself ' 
from below'. Legal rules, she tells us, ' may already be emerging from 
amidst the chaos of Cyberspace...in some respects the cyber community, at 
this juncture, could be regarded as a 'pre-legal' world and the change to a 
legal world will inevitably involve the creation of rules dealing with 
change, adjudication and recognition of rights. Most communities will 
regulate themselves, in practice, by a combination of formal or 'book law' 
('top-down' rule formation) and also by acknowledgement of the 
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customary rules which have evolved to supplement this source of law and 
to cater for what 'actually happens' ('bottom-up' regulation). Examples are 
the rites of passage, initiation or induction for newcomers to that 
community which either enable them to integrate more easily, or, 
conversely, create a barrier to entry to the society which must be 
successfully negotiated. 
 
For Rowland, progress towards a self regulating internet law is at best 
uneven. Although certain customs in cyber communities 'appear to be in 
the process of being elevated to the status of customary rules... many rules 
remain purely customary, having no enforceable sanction attached to their 
non-adherence, indeed it is doubtful whether a universally enforceable 
sanction can be applied in Cyberspace.' Rowland concedes that we do not 
have’ to measure the success of custom as a regulatory mechanism purely 
by the availability of express sanctions. Successful customs may be 
obeyed, not so much because of the threat of sanctions, but for fear of 
standing out from the crowd. Such rules may be adhered to not out of 
personal conviction, but, rather, as an indication that such conduct is 
conventionally accepted and so participants are happy to accept it as a 
standard of assessment. People may also accept rules not necessarily 
because of any issue of morality but possible out of fear, self-interest, 
coercion or habit'. Nonetheless, ‘what is not apparent in cyber 
communities is such an assurance of acceptable behaviour, at least as 
judged by the prevailing standards and mores of the physical world. In 
comparison, the range of norms and values in cyber communities seems to 
cover a much wider and more diverse range. What may be absent in the 
virtual world is the necessary degree of uniformity and unanimity defining 
a custom which has the capacity to metamorphose into a legal rule and 
become both binding and obligatory.' 
 
The literature on internet law has grown exponentially since Rowland 
posted her reflections (though it does not as far as I am aware make much 
reference to Ehrlich). The question of what norms are appropriate for 
cyberspace (and providing them with a history or legitimacy) has changed 
as the internet itself has developed from an idealised utopia of caring and 
sharing- with its folkloristic evolution of norms of good manners- to an 
ever expanding site for commercial activities as well as the exploitation of 
the less attractive aspects of human sociability. It is less and less possible 
to think of users mainly in terms of on -line communities- and  some of the 
communities that do exist in this space use the internet to spread hate 
propaganda aimed at others
33
 . But it continues to surprise. Pressed into 
service by the market it can sometimes rise up against property rights as 
where users collectively reveal trade secrets. Seemingly feeble in the face 
of the armed might of the state, the diffusion of video photographs 
provides the evidence to  protest at the conduct of  military operatives and 
secret police from that in United States military installations to police 
stations in Egypt.  
 
                                                 
33
 ANTONIO ROVERSI, L'ODIO IN RETE, Il Mulino, Bologna, (2006)  
(being translated for Ashgate Press)  
The internet is not a world apart. It belongs to and helps further those 
economic developments by which consumers (those who can afford to 
consume)  come more and more to play the role of producers. The real and 
virtual worlds intersect as shown through the application of  copyright  law 
or privacy protections. The problems it throws up mirror many of the 
crimes and civil wrongs found in the real world. What goes on in the 
virtual world of 'second life' is all too reminiscent of what happens in 
ordinary life. The internet provides occasions for blogging feuds, cyber 
bullying,  defamatory Google bombing, misuse of ' spiders' or cookies, and 
the all too evident spread of spamming. Enforcement of norms is 
complicated by the use of anonymity and the difficulty of knowing when 
users can be assumed to be informed of norm changes. On the other hand, 
sanctions from which there is no appeal, for example where users are 
banishing users from given sites, may be considered too severe to be left to 
private parties.  
 
Insofar as internet does maintain a sort of autonomy there is scope for 
more investigation into how far group exercises in rule making and rule 
application are constructing a distinctive form of living law. The collective 
encyclopaedia Wikipedia , for example, does use law- like procedures for 
rule making and fact finding as ways of  deciding whether an article's 
content is sufficiently evidenced, whether links to other entries are 
justified, what counts as an insult, and so on. But there is a need here too 
for protection from the guardians. In March 2007 for example there were 
reports about a fake professor known as Essjay whose 'authority' to 
arbitrate disputes and remove site vandalism about articles on religion 
turned out to be based on false credentials: He was obliged to resign from 
his role because, as the co- founder explained, the encyclopaedia relies on 
'trust and tolerance'.  
 
Order without law  
 
The third literature that can be connected to Ehrlich’s ideas about living 
law is one less interested in how associations impose their norms and more 
in how patterned behaviour gives rise to the working orders of 
associations. Order rather than law is the focus here, as seen in such titles 
Robert Ellickson's celebrated Order without law – How neighbours settle 
disputes,
34
 or Eric Posner’s A theory of norms 
35
. The same is true even of 
Michael Reisman's Law  in Brief encounters -despite having law its title
36
. 
This line of enquiry can be distinguished from the previous literatures 
considered so far insofar as it refuses legal centralism not by contrasting 
the centre and the periphery or by hypothesising the existence of rival 
legal regimes, but by questioning the centrality of law as compared to 
norms. Writers seek to explain the origin and content of norms, in 
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particular they develop theories of norms in the context of cooperation, 
collective solutions and welfare maximisation. Even if not all writers on 
these topics take their cue from Ehrlich, at least some of this work can also 
be traced back to him. Especially relevant is his advice to move from 
studying conflict to understanding order, to distinguish situations 'at war’ 
from those ‘at peace’, and to think about expectations as much as 
sanctions- or of expectations as sanctions. His  controversial attempt to 
distinguish legal from other types of norms also shows him addressing 
these issues. 
 
There is by now an enormous multi- disciplinary library - ranging across 
evolutionary biology, psychology, philosophy, law,  economics- and 
sociology -which deals with the source and efficacy of norms. Sociology 
of law alone will not be able get to master this subject. But once Ehrlich's 
ideas about living law are seen to embrace a wide range of normative 
phenomena this leads to a richer set of questions than merely whether the 
norms of semi- autonomous associations count as law. We are led to 
investigate the relationship between law and norms. How and when do 
norms turn into law (as in the case of the internet or lex mercatoria)? How 
does law become normative? When do norms mandate not following or 
using law? How far norms do depend on associational life. How big or 
amorphous must such associations be? What about the fact that we are 
simultaneously members of very many associations? As this suggests, 
research on order without law tends to be more radical than merely 
looking for the law beyond the law. Take, for example, Macaulay's famous 
findings about the extent to which businessmen did not conduct their 
exchanges on the basis of contract law relying instead on the shared norm 
of 'keeping one's promises' and 'standing behind your product' which 
provide the underpinnings of normal business behaviour
37
. Those 
interested in norms would then want to go further and ask about the social 
origins of such norms and they way they are reproduced. 
 
Whatever plausible links can be drawn between this sort of work and 
Ehrlich’s writings, in practice it can often be difficult to assess his actual 
influence. This can be well illustrated by considering the reference  
Ellickson makes to Ehrlich in his book 'Order without law'. Ellickson's 
claim is that ‘impersonal norms are among the most magnificent of 
cultural achievements’. To understand them better he sets out to synthesise 
insights from the sociology of law and economics and law. He criticises 
sociologists of law for treating the content of norms as exogenous and 
being too satisfied with thick descriptions rather than cumulative testable 
theory. He argues that we must learn what norms are, not just how they are 
transmitted. Law and economics writers, on the other hand, he sees as too 
obsessed with the relationship of norms to wealth maximisation and the 
problems of how groups can overcome the problem of ‘ free riders’. 
Ellickson's goal is to produce a ' general theory of social control', one that 
could predict, on the basis of independent variables describing society, the 
content of the society’s rules. These would in turn need to be distinguished 
as substantive, remedial, procedural and controller- selecting.  
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 In this book, however, he settles for the more modest aim of  illustrating 
the logic of one social sub- system, that of 'informal social control'. To 
develop his predictions Ellickson draws on his own empirical study of 
rancher's communities as well as historical research into dispute resolution 
in whaling communities. To explain the rationality of cooperation in the 
absence of law, he describes the details of dispute processing, the events 
which trigger sanctions, and how relevant information is gathered. What is 
of interest for us is that  it is not until page 150 that he actually makes any 
reference to Ehrlich. At this point he tells us blithely that ‘Ehrlich believed 
that law is relatively unimportant and that social forces tend to produce the 
same norms in all human society ‘
38
. Ellickson then goes on to explain that 
Ehrlich (like Durkheim) is to be seen as a functionalist who saw the 
sanctioning of norms as the way social groups maintained their solidarity. 
And he complains that functionalist arguments are circular because they 
do not say for which groups the function is being performed and assume 
that organisms have a objectively determinable state of health. 
 
Ellickson is clearly not interested in providing us with a rounded analysis 
of Ehrlich work. But it is still surprising to find such a superficial reading 
coming from such an eminent scholar. Did Ehrlich really believe 'that law 
is unimportant’? Ellickson just assumes that whatever Ehrlich is talking 
about it is not law, because he (along with many others) insists that State 
law is likely to be inefficacious unless backed up by other norms. But it 
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could as well be argued that by introducing the concept of ‘living law’ 
Ellickson exaggerates the importance of law by finding it everywhere. 
Certainly this is the interpretation favoured by those legal pluralists who 
take Ehrlich as a warrant for characterising rival normative schemes as 
law, to all effects. As far as the charge of functionalism is concerned, 
Ehrlich may indeed be interested in showing us how associations use law -
like norms to solve problems of functioning and reproduction, But he also 
offers examples of behaviour, as for example where businessmen do not 
insist on collecting their debts, which go beyond this role. More 
fundamentally, his book also contains discussions of how norms reflect 
changing interests which it is the judges' task to reconcile in the direction 
of progressive social change .  
 
Ellickson's synthesis of economics and law and sociology of law leans 
towards a rational actor perspective. Most of the many other recent studies 
of norms tend to be even more influenced by the individualistic bias of 
economics of law and of game theory. A recent study by Eric Posner, for 
example, also links norms to the question concerning the rationality of 
cooperation 
39
Posner sees norms as rules that distinguishes desirable from 
undesirable behaviour and give third parties authority to punish. He is 
particular interested in showing how norms play a role in allowing actors 
to avoid dilemmas of non- cooperation by signalling their willingness to be 
reliable collaborators rather than act as free riders. He offers some 
interesting insights into how and when the following of  norms can help 
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participants distinguish genuine from false signals. He also discusses how 
law tries to harness the strength of norms and when legal regulation should 
or should not be used instead of relying on norms. 
 
But, for all its plausibility, the claim that order relies more on shared 
norms than on official legal processes has also been critiqued. Insofar as 
Ellickson’s arguments are based on empirical research they are open to 
counter -examples based on other case studies. Thus some research has 
also shown that resort may be made to official type law even in what 
would appear to be ideal conditions for maintaining order without law.  
Eric Feldman, an expert on Japanese law, has recently offered a 
fascinating and finely grained  account of the workings of what he calls the 
tuna court in the Tokyo fish market. 
40
Here post-auction disputes between 
dealers and buyers, mainly regarding hidden defects in the fish, are 
routinely and expeditiously resolved by judges in ways that reinforce 
rather than substitute for the cooperation between the participants. 
Feldman claims that his case- study goes against what Bernstein, Ellickson 
and others would predict, given that these participants form a community 
of continually interacting players who could be expected to create their 
own informal normative order. In Ehrlich's language we see here an 
illustration of the way norms for decision can also guarantee peaceful 
coexistence. What is more, this preference for court -like procedures is 
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found in a culture which many (though not Feldman himself) see as one 
normally geared to the avoidance of law.   
 
Ellickson's work, and, in general, the arguments of the so- called ‘new 
norms jurisprudence’, have also been subjected to more fundamental 
theoretical objections. As we have already noted in discussing 'the law 
beyond the law', it is also (increasingly) difficult to draw the line between 
sources of  order within and outside a given setting. Even if it is not 
official law that produces order there is likely to be some symbiosis 
between its projected order and the actual order shaped by and within the 
association or organisation. It can be a mistake to credit the idea that 
norms produce order independent of  models in the larger environing 
framework. Mitchell, for example, has recently complained that ‘there is 
little attention paid to the way in which group norms or private law 
systems relate to or are influenced by either legal, moral or customary 
norms that permeate the society as a whole. … norms – whether the norms 
of the Elks Club, the New York Diamond Merchants Exchange, various 
religious groups, or the automobile insurance industry, are at some level 
inseparable from the web of norms that influences the behaviour of each of 
the members of these groups.’ 
41
  
 
Mitchell proposes that we speak not of 'order without law', but 'order 
within law'. As he says, 'The private law systems noted by Ellickson and 
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Bernstein are grounded on the notion of legal obligation and legal order 
that pervades our society. Or, to put the claim more modestly, the legal 
systems which these private law systems mimic have been so pervasive in 
our society for so long that it seems unlikely that the new norms theorists 
can separate out the influence of the legal order upon the creation of 
private law norms’. Mitchell's point is that official law serves as a model 
even when its details are not known or understood. 'The problem with 
Ellickson's work' he says, ' is not the valuable field study but rather the 
conclusions he draws. Ellickson found what he took to be a startling 
conclusion. When neighbours had border disputes or arguments over 
fences or over trespassing livestock; they didn't sue each other – they 
negotiated out their difficulties in a way that – given the repetitive nature 
of the issues – became regularized. This he viewed as the spontaneous 
generation of order and the irrelevance of law, supported by the fact that, 
when surveyed, most of his interviewees either didn't know the governing 
law or got it wrong.  
 
'Ellickson's ranchers might not have known the law. They might have 
thought they knew the law but gotten its principles wrong. They might 
have made up their own rules to avoid litigation. But there is one thing that 
I am certain that they did know; there was law, that law governed the kinds 
of disputes in which they engaged, and that law was available to them 
should they choose to use it (as sometimes they did). In other words, 
Ellickson's ranchers were resolving their disputes on the broad background 
of an understanding of legal obligation that is immanent in our society and 
derives from the notion of a society governed by a system of laws– when 
one person causes damage to another's person or property, there are 
circumstances under which the law (if invoked by lawsuit) will hold that 
party to account. The idea of legal order already existed in Shasta County 
– what Ellickson found that was different were the principles that were 
applied.' 
 
The fact that the literature about norms is so vast also means that it is riven 
by almost as many disagreements as is the case for arguments about the 
nature of law. Differences in definitions, regarding for example how far 
norms should be seen more as instruments or as cultural constraints on 
action, tend to reproduce major divisions in sociological approaches to 
society. Others reflect the choice between privileging a more macro or 
micro focus on social life. Some efforts to locate the source of normative 
order go beyond the level of Ehrlich's focus on associations or the 
interactions of people involved in repeated relationships. The international 
legal scholar Michael Reisman claims to have discovered what he calls the 
micro -law of relatively fleeting relationships. In a series of well- observed 
descriptions Reisman shows that people handle the problems of everyday 
life as if they were small -scale analogies of the larger problems of legal 
order
42
. He explains how norms enable people to have a sense of what is 
and is not appropriate in situations such as those of looking at others,  in 
talking with equals, or with the boss, in making queues and holding places 
for others in line. Decisions about such matters cannot be and are not 
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arbitrary or else such valuable institutions as the queue would break down 
43
. 
 
Although he entitles his book Law in brief encounters, what Reisman 
actually sets out to describe is (only) a form of de facto living law. He 
cannot mean that the rules generated in these situations are already 
(official) law because he goes on to ask when law should recognise or 
interfere in these micro- legal orders. In general he is favour of keeping 
state bureaucracy out of such matters. But he (as an international lawyer?) 
does also suggest that there are some standards that micro- law must pass 
and "that the practices of all groups must be appraised in terms of the 
international code of human rights" so that "practices inconsistent with the 
international standard be adjusted." 
44
As this suggests, though Reisman 
does not seek to anchor his insights in older writers, there are certainly 
many parallels with Ehrlich's concerns. It is interesting too to find that 
Reisman insists that the norms he discusses are kept alive not so much by 
the sanctioning of breaches (albeit that this can and does take place)  but 
by the decision of the norm- abiders to reaffirm the existence of the norm 
despite the breach. 
 
If authors such as Reisman emphasise the parallels between legal order 
and micro- order in society others, such as Jutras think it important to ask ‘ 
does the normative structure of everyday life mirror the architecture of 
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official law ‘.
45
They urge us to look for differences as well as similarities. 
It may be instructive for example that the  everyday ‘feels’ non- legal, 
whilst the law appears self -contained. Tamanaha, too considers it is an 
error to confuse legal order and social order 
46
It is important, he argues, to 
see that law is not necessarily a source of social order and social order is 
not necessarily law- like. 
47
This leads him to be ambivalent about Ehrlich's 
claims concerning normative order. ‘In an important sense, Ehrlich's 
observations raised a sharp critique of the mirror thesis and the social 
order function of law …. In another important sense, however, Ehrlich's 
work is the ultimate extension of the mirror thesis and the social order 
function of law. In effect his argument is that if positive law does not 
mirror social norms and does not in fact maintain social order, it has lost 
its superior entitlement to the claim of being the law, and the label must be 
given back, or at least shared with the "living law", the actually lived 
social norms that do satisfy these criteria.
48
Tamanaha argues that 'The 
traditionally assumed relationship gets things precisely upside down. It is 
state law that is dependent on these other sources of social order if it is to 
                                                 
45
 Daniel Jutras, The legal dimensions of everyday life' 16 CANADA 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY: 45-65. (2001) 
46
 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,  A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW 
AND SOCIETY, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2001). 
47
 I am relying on the thorough re-analysis by William Twining,  A Post-
Westphalian Conception of Law, 37 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW: 
199–258. (2003) 
48
 TAMANAHA, 2001 op.cit. at 31. 
have a chance of exerting an influence. 
49
But,  of course, this exactly takes 
us back to what Ehrlich was trying to tell us! 
 
Ehrlich and the normative challenges of  plural legalities 
 
How far does this examination of what Ehrlich meant by living law, and 
what has been made of this idea since, help us make progress with the  
three issues on which this special issue seeks to focus? A number of points 
may be made by way of conclusion: 
 
1. There is sometimes a curious sense of deja vue in reading the 
contributions to this special issue. When Christine Parker tells us in her 
contribution
50
that 'the reality of governance means that the aspiration or 
ambition of law must be to ride the ‘frontier’ between imperialism 
(regulation) and being democratic and responsive (emancipation), it is 
easy to think back to Ehrlich's situation. He too would have recognised 'the 
new governance image of a network with nodes connecting the strands' in 
which 'law is not necessarily centered on the state'. He would probably 
even have agreed that law should 'open out to embrace other regulatory 
orderings' and that 'it gains its vitality from them, but also seeks to critique 
them and hold them to standards of justice. Ehrlich's ideas are often more 
subtle than what has been made of them by later writers, as in the way his 
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concept of 'living law' was transformed into that of 'law in action'
51
. His 
starting assumptions about how organisations create normative constraints 
still offers a valid alternative to, on the one hand, the rational- choice 
model of individuals seeking to maximise their utilities, and, on the other, 
a conception of law as a repository of  communal meaning and identity
52
. 
Ehrlich's actors are motivated by a variety of reasons ranging from interest 
to honour but above all find themselves caught up in institutionalised webs 
of reciprocity (not always based on fair or equal exchange).  
 
But simply going back to founding scholars cannot provide a quick fix for 
current dilemmas. Over a range of questions recourse to Ehrlich involves 
re-interpreting and re-appropriating his arguments for present 
purposes.
53
Ehrlich did not, could not, envisage the issues we face today. 
His arguments have little to do with situations where  state norms and 
organisational norms interact as they do  in many late industrial societies. 
When some of the contributors to this special issue talk of pluralism as a 
'social construction' rather than just an objective situation, or when they 
suggest that legal pluralism should be studied as a strategy used by groups, 
communities (and even the state itself), they are going beyond Ehrlich's 
formulations.If anything, re- reading Ehrlich's work can help take us to the 
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root of some of the conceptual and practical dilemmas that we have not yet 
managed to overcome. These include the difficulty of defining law except 
in terms similar to that of state law, the mistaken tendency to assume that 
each group or organisation has its own law, the problem of how to 
distinguish legal from moral obligations, and the conflict between juristic 
and social- scientific ways of defining law. Likewise, any effort to create 
or protect multiple legal regimes - including Ehrlich's suggestion that 
different rule systems could be appropriate for relations between parties 'at 
peace' as compared to those relevant when they are 'in conflict', faces the 
risk of  'forum shopping', whereby actors will choose to mobilise those 
rules most in their interest, irrespective of the larger functional reasons for 
keeping regimes distinct. 
 
This review has focused more on the descriptive and explanatory value of  
Ehrlich's concept of living law rather than it's philosophic status or its  
utility in normative argument. The most important lesson of this paper is 
that if we want to overcome the  'sense of unconstructiveness, even dead-
end, in the study of legal pluralism', of which Ido Shahar complains in this 
special issue, we need to examine non -state legal orders in a larger 
sociological perspective, rather than get caught up in an argument about 
definitions. In fact, we still know far too little about when state law or non- 
state normative orders are preferred: more attention needs to be given to 
differences between branches, levels and types of law; in particular, 
different types of legal culture can reflect and encourage very different 
choices. 
54
  
 
Ehrlich's concept was not intended to resolve normative questions such as 
whether ethnic groups should have a right to their own forms of ordering, 
but rather to show us why jurists need to take the facticity of such orders 
into account. He was not discussing whether state law should provide 
room for non- state law but rather pointing to the many arenas where law 
not backed up by the state already existed. Nor was he arguing that living 
law is necessarily better than state law. It would be difficult otherwise to 
explain the inclusion of anti -state organizations, including criminal 
organizations, in his definition of living law. 
55
 He also says little about the 
risk that communities and organisations could repress the individuals 
subject to their influence, though he does maintain a role for the judiciary 
(and the legislature) in seeking to bring about social justice as a long- term 
project. By contrast, some of the recent authors whose attempts to grapple 
with plural legalities today we have been discussing, do perhaps go too far 
to the other extreme in risking what Habermas called the ' juridification of 
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the lifeworld'
56
. This is arguably the case for Reisman's proposal to police 
the world of 'microlaw', or the related suggestion by Melissaris that we 
need to take as 'seriously' the order of the queue outside a nightclub as we 
do the ' legal commitment of communities with religious or other moral 
bonds'. 
 
At the same time, as this suggests, we always need to keep in mind the 
relationship between empirical and normative enquiries. We have seen that 
whether we call regimes 'law' or not will depend on our disciplinary 
affiliations and practical purposes. What makes sense for explanatory 
purposes will not necessarily map on to normative argument. This may 
help account for why, paradoxically, John Griffiths sees legal pluralism as 
at its strongest where it is not acknowledged by the state,
57
 even if, for 
Simon Roberts 
58
just using the term law is itself a victory for legal 
centralism. Recognising, as Shahar proposes, that the state is itself a 
collection of differing regimes may help us get beyond debates about best 
to overcome 'legal centralism'. The first line of development from Ehrlich's 
notion of living law that we have discussed, that concerned with 'law 
beyond the state', offers ample evidence of multiple legalities in the 'law in 
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action' of innumerable bureaucracies and functionaries who claim to be 
acting in the name of the state. 
 
2. A further issue which connects our enquiry with that of this special 
issue has to do with the relative advantages of looking for overlaps in 
topics under investigation as opposed to the competing necessity to bring 
out important differences. In our review of Ehrlich's work we argued that 
'Law beyond the state', 'law without the state', and 'order without law' 
should be seen as overlapping but also distinguishable phenomena, 
depending on whether we seek to give attention to either the law as it 
emerges in practice, the existence of rival legal regimes, or  the centrality 
of law as compared to norms in the construction of social order. Ehrlich 
did not clearly differentiate the power to translate law into action, the way 
organisations impose roles, and the genesis of  'social facts' by which 
expectations are enforced without the need of state sanctions. Likewise, he 
moved promiscuously between the levels of the community, the 
organisation and the individual. Later writers need to be more precise, and 
they do not always agree where amongst these factors and levels to search 
for the origin of normativity (as we have seen, Ellickson and Posner adopt 
an individualistic approach that is close to that adopted by those who 
advocate greater privatisation of law
59
). Most fundamentally, Ehrlich did 
not always keep separate the two foundational enquiries of sociology of 
law: how 'is' become ought and how 'ought' becomes 'is'. Tending to 
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privilege the former problem, he also sometimes gives the impression that 
facts are enough by themselves to create ' normativity' whereas, as 
Jonathan Webber has recently reminded us,
 60
   normative phenomena 
ultimately rest on arguments rather than brute facts.  
 
Much the same applies to the matters discussed in this special issue. It is 
certainly valuable to trace the connections in these literatures which too 
often ignore each others existence. But it is also important to recognize 
what they do not have in common. If the idea of living law, which might 
be expected to exhibit coherence since it was first developed by one 
author, in fact raises distinct issues, this is even more true for the three 
themes of privatisation, pluralism and multiculturalism. Because law has 
so many roles, involving amongst other things, order, regulation and the 
search for justice, it is unlikely that that we will find a common 
denominator in thinking about alternatives to state law. From one point of 
view multiculturalism can indeed be seen as a form of  privatisation of 
law. But in many other respects the two phenomena carry quite different 
normative implications. As Talia Fisher argues in this special issue
61
, 'the 
privatization model and multiculturalism represent polar and conflicting 
conceptions of legal decentralization and that, in the asserted sense, the 
privatization of law model not only amounts to an anti-state project but 
also to an anti-communitarian project'. 
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 The need to give attention to both overlap and differences can be well 
illustrated from the example of self- regulation by diamond merchants The 
avoidance of state courts here is over- determined- and illustrates all three 
themes on which this special issue concentrates. Diamond traders, the 
large majority of whom belong to very orthodox Jewish communities, do 
not 'need' to go elsewhere to resolve their disagreements. But going to 
state courts is also strongly disapproved of. As Talia Fisher explains, the 
principle of private dispute resolution by diamond merchants therefore 
represents a different challenge to law than the issue of how far self 
government should be delegated to orthodox Jewish or other similar 
culturally distinctive communities: 'The diamond industry regime 
embodies the privatization model's vision of the mediating social agent to 
which state lawmaking capacities should be delegated, whereas the 
network of rabbinical courts in the ultra-orthodox community is a clear 
manifestation of the multicultural alternative vision of legal 
decentralization'. In practice, however, these two sources of plural legality 
reinforce each other. As Barak Richman has shown
62
, numerous 
constraints make it difficult for  members of the orthodox community to 
abandon their group and this increases their trustworthiness as business 
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partners. The intergenerational cooperation between long term dealers in 
this industry then means that they can enforce contracts that are 
unenforceable for other merchants. But the economic advantages provided 
by this groups' avoidance of courts is, however, now under being 
counterbalanced by increasing use of cheap labour in Asia and by direct 
selling through the internet.  
 
 
3. A final consideration concerns the extent to which globalisation and 
transnational legal processes more generally are changing the relationship 
between the state and all three of the plural legalities we have been asked 
to address. Not everyone agrees that globalisation means a decline in 
reliance of formal law. Lawrence Summers, the American secretary of  
treasury ‘in a world without courts, one lends money to one’s brother- in-
law and relies on one’s wife’s parents to enforce the agreement. In a world 
without borders, arms length formal contracts become ever more critical to 
innovation and growth. So too the means of reliably enforcing them. In 
such circumstances the American preference for rules over understandings 
and for law over custom, emerges as a major strength'
63
. But, for most 
observers, we have entered what Santos calls  a third period which he 
describes as 'post-modern legal plurality.' The loss of sovereignty by the 
nation state (or at least many nation states) in comparison to other agents 
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or agencies, both reflects and permits the growth of  legal pluralism, 
privatisation of law and multiculturalism. And it changes the terms of what 
is at stake - we could  think for example of the transformation in the role 
of diasporic cultural minorities when these are linked with large home 
populations (as in the case of  Chinese minorities).  
 
Ehrlich's social context may seem very remote from ours. But, for 
Teubner
64
, the fact that Ehrlich's ideas were developed in a place in which 
the state was relatively weak makes them particularly fruitful in helping us 
understand why global law works differently from international law. As 
we have seen, the idea of living law has been found particularly relevant to 
those seeking to understand lex mercatoria and the internet even if  
exploration of law's role in these phenomena goes beyond those that could 
have been anticipated by Ehrlich, whether this involves autopoietic theory 
of communicative sub- systems, or the way the 'architecture' of  
information technology builds in particular normative choices. But the 
way we use his work should vary with time and place of its 'appropriation'. 
 In his own time Ehrlich may have been right to underline the limits of the 
Austrian imperial state ( but even then he probably failed to recognise that 
the state is not only a source of coercion). It may be debatable how far 
Ehrlich as a matter of normative choice wanted to limit the role of the state 
65
 but his scepticism can be a useful corrective at a time of over- 
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confidence in social engineering. At a time when the state is enfeebled by 
globalisation, however, associations may if anything have grown too 
important. We are now invited to find ways to bolster the role of state in 
controlling the power of pathological corporations that owe responsibility 
only to their shareholders;
 66
 and we worry about the politics of World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund as they nudge or whip non- 
compliant states into line.  
 
Globalisation also changes the form of law. As Ronen Shamir explains in 
his contribution, 'governance is premised on facilitating 'private' forms of 
authority: corporations, trade and technical-professional associations, 
accountancy and credit rating agencies, and standard setting organizations 
increasingly all assume regulatory roles and intensively experiment with 
novel forms of legality 
67
. Similarly, 'rules and regulations, are partially 
replaced by a variety of 'guidelines', 'principles', 'codes of conduct' and 
'standards' that do not necessarily enjoy the coercive backing of the state.'  
Christine Parker, for her part, sees these as methods that can also be 
employed by the responsive state. Reflection on Ehrlich's work is relevant 
here because of his central focus on the role of associations. It can help us 
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approach the question how far the significance of law made by 
international bodies, multi- nationals, public and private NGO's, etc is the 
way this undermines state law or only represents a new vector for its type 
of legality. Ehrlich wrote mainly about how organisations and associations 
regulated their own members or business partners rather than how they 
created a larger order. But what he said about the way they induce 
conformity in their own membership may also have something to teach us 
in a world in which the idea or illusion of common participation in an 
international order is ever more achieved through the signalling and 
certifying of common standards.
68
 This pressure towards conformity and 
the 'normalisation' of behaviour and ideas should also be borne in mind in 
drawing up any balance- sheet of how far we are moving towards or away 
from plural legalities. 
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